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Philosophers from Aristotle to vanlnwagen 1 have 
questioned the possibility of preserving ethics if hard 
determinism is true. Thus it has been argued that we must reject 
hard determinism because of the apparent "violence" it does to 
our basic conception of morality. For example, Howard Hintz 
maintains that: 
[Hard determinism) destroys the foundations of all 
prescriptive ethics except on the arbitrary-power level. If the 
possibility of establishing moral values and standards is removed, 
then the basis of meaningful and purposeful living, of human 
dignity, and ultimately of civilized society itself is undermined.2 
In this brief paper, I shall be concerned with offering a partial 
answer to this charge by considering the effects of hard 
determinism on one of the more significant and fundamental 
concepts of traditional ethics, that of the moral 'ought.' By 
'hard determinism' I refer to the thesis which maintains that 
all actions are caused and therefore no one is free with regard to 
his/her actions. By implication it follows that no one is 
morally responsible for his/her actions. In what follows, I 
shall demonstrate that (1) traditional assumptions regarding 
the moral 'ought' are, indeed, in conflict with hard 
1The connection between human freedom and morality was first 
discussed by Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics (Book III, Ch. I) 
though philosophers generally cite the work of Kant in discussing the 
connection. Passages in The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue HI, XV 
and in Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals [97-98] 
make it evident that Kant viewed freedom as fundamental to both act 
and agent morality. More recently, the topic has been considered by 
Peter vanlnwagen. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1983, pp. 207-209. 
2 Howard W. Hintz, "Some Further Reflections on Moral 
Responsibility," in Sidney Hook, Determinism and Freedom in the 
Age of Modern Science. New York: New York University Press, 1958, 
p. 163. 
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determinism but that (2) the term allows for a reanalysis 
which, though untraditional, is coherent and meaningful. Thus 
although the adoption of hard determinism does confict with 
the traditional ethical view of the moral 'ought/ we can, by 
reanalysis of the term, maintain "the basis of meaningful and 
purposeful living, of human dignity, and ultimately of 
civilized society itself."3 My argument will demonstrate that, 
as Sidgwick states, "the adoption of [hard] Determinism will 
not-except in certain exceptional circumstances or on certain 
theological assumptions—reasonably modify a man's view of 
what it is right for him to do or his reasons for doing it."4 
The obvious starting point for this inquiry is to consider the 
question, "Is freedom implied by the moral 'ought'?" And the 
answer seems to be that, at least in regard to traditional 
morality, it is. Statements of the form, "You ought to keep 
promises" and "You should not have lied. You ought to have 
told him the truth," understood as traditional moral claims, 
necessarily presuppose the existence of human freedom. That 
they do so would seem to be undeniable if we simply recall the 
by now trite but nevertheless generally accepted claim that 
"ought implies can" (i.e., 'ought' implies that if it was the case 
that you ought to have done A, then it must be true that you 
could have done what you did not do). 
Since hard determinism maintains that if S did A, S could 
not have done otherwise, the hard determinist cannot, without 
contradicting himself, make sense or use of the traditional 
moral 'ought.' To claim that in saying "S ought to do A" one is 
prescribing or directing S to do something which he can, in fact, 
do or not do-that is viewing A as a real option (or choice)—is 
meaningless or simply false according to hard determinism. 
And this is no small matter. For if hard determinism is true it, 
at the least, changes the very nature of what we take ourselves 
to be saying in stating a moral rule or in making a moral 
judgment of an action. But, in fact, the abandonment of the 
traditional moral 'ought' does not necessarily destroy "the 
3Although this paper is specifically intended to defend hard 
determinism against this criticism, it applies equally to any theory on 
the freedom of human action which denies that human beings are 
ever free (in a morally relevant sense) with regard to their actions. 
4Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962, p. 71. 
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foundations of all prescriptive ethics except on the arbitrary-
power level," nor remove "the possibility of establishing moral 
values and standards" or undermine "the basis of civilized 
society itself." 5 In what follows, I will demonstrate that 
although hard determinism does conflict with the 
meaningfulness of the moral 'ought' as traditionally 
interpreted it does not destroy or negate our ability to use the 
moral 'ought' meaningfully. In order to show this to be so, it 
will be necessary to offer some way of reinterpreting the 'ought' 
contained in moral rules and moral judgments. That is, unless 
we are willing to maintain that all moral rules and judgments 
are meaningless (a position which surely does destroy ethics), 
we must discover a plausible way of reanalyzing this 'ought' 
which does not presuppose human freedom. 
For the hard determinist, the correct (or most plausible) 
analysis of the 'ought' of moral rules and judgments is as 
follows: The 'ought' in "You ought to keep your promise" is 
very similar, though not identical, to the 'ought' of (a) "You 
ought to keep a 'nest egg' (a financial emergency fund)," or (b) 
"You ought to try to keep a 'nest egg'." First note that in neither 
(a) nor (b) do we automatically presuppose that you can, in fact, 
keep a 'nest egg'. If this lack of presupposition is not obvious, 
consider the following: We would not be surprised if we turned 
on the P.6.S. television station during a program on personal 
finance and heard the lecturer state, "One ought to keep a 'nest 
egg'." Clearly the lecturer cannot know the details of all her 
viewers' finances and thus she cannot know whether or not (all) 
her viewers can (are financially able to) keep a 'nest egg.' 
Still, we do not find her statement that "one ought to keep a 
'nest egg'" incoherent or inappropriate. All that is needed for 
the lecturer's statement to be sensible is that she assume that at 
least one member of the audience may someday be in a position 
to act on her advice. Her intent then is to define the (most) 
desirable action (She is stating a prima facie 'ought'--one 
which indicates what action would be economically desirable. 
And this prima facie 'ought' will become a final or an actual 
'ought' i.e., one which indicates what action is in fact 
economically desirable, when an individual is in a position to 
act on it). Thus by saying, "You ought to keep a 'nest egg,'" she 
sHintz, p. 163. 
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simply means to assert, "It would be (is) economically desirable 
that you keep a 'nest egg'." 
As already stated, the hard determinist should construe 
the 'ought' of moral rules and judgments, in a way which is 
similar, though not identical to, the analysis of the 'ought' 
described above. That is, the 'ought' in "you ought to keep your 
promises" is the 'ought' of desirability. But what sort of 
desirability is here intended? While in maintaining "You 
ought to keep a 'nest egg'" we mean to imply "It is economically 
desirable to keep a 'nest egg'," when maintaining "you ought to 
keep your promises," we mean to imply "It is morally desirable 
to keep your promises." To say of something that it is morally 
desirable means that it is morally correct, morally right, 
morally good. Thus on a hard determinist analysis, by "You 
ought to keep your promises," we mean to imply that "It is 
morally desirable to keep your promises." (I.e., depending upon 
the circumstances we may be stating a prima facie 'ought,' one 
which indicates what action would be morally desirable under 
specific circumstances, or an actual 'ought,' one which indicates 
what action is morally desirable for an individual who is able 
to act on our statement).6 
But an 'ought' of desirability does not presuppose freedom. 
It merely suggests behavior which is to be preferred when or if 
an individual is able to behave accordingly. Now it would 
make no sense for anyone to maintain that "S ought to do A" if 
A were impossible (e.g. if "A" were "flying out to Alaska under 
one's own steam"). So when one says "S ought to do A" one does 
presuppose that A is an action that it may be possible (at some 
time) for S to perform. But one does not presuppose that A is an 
action that S will, in fact, ever be able to perform. For S's 
ability to perform A rests on a myriad of causal conditions 
(including that of the influence of one's saying "S ought to do 
A") which one (in all likelihood) does not know. Thus one 
merely suggests what action is morally desirable if S is ever, in 
fact, in a position (if it is ever causally possible) for S to do A. 
^ince the concept of an individual being able to act on a statement 
may appear to imply the notion of freedom, let me briefly suggest now 
what should become clearer in the latter part of this discussion. 
When I say that "S is able to act on a statement," I simply mean that 
S's belief in the (content of the) statement is the only additional causal 
condition necessary for S's performing the action. 
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But given this analysis, two related issues must be 
clarified: 
(1) What, on this hard dcterminist analysis, does it mean for 
an action to be "morally good (right, correct)"? 
(2) Given such an analysis, what are the nature and function 
of moral rules and moral judgments of actions? Are moral 
rules still prescriptive? Are they categorical or hypothetical? 
The answer to question (1) is that for a hard determinist, 
the 'ought' of morality, the 'ought' of "You ought (morally) to 
do A," should be understood as "It is morally good, correct, right 
(i.e. desirable) that you do A." In saying this, I intend that 
that which is morally good (correct, right)" has the same 
meaning, in most cases, for the hard determinist as it does for 
the Libertarian or Compatibilist. That is, for example, the 
hard determinist Universal Hedonic Utilitarian will maintain 
that "A is morally good" simply means "A produces the 
greatest pleasure for the greatest number." The hard 
determinist Contractarian (i.e., one holding an ethical view 
which conforms to the "Social Contract" theory) will maintain 
that "A is morally good" simply means "A is an action which 
conforms to jointly acknowledged principles (principles 
acknowledged or agreed upon by individuals in "the state of 
nature"). 7 Insofar as we understand Intuitionism to be the 
ethical view which maintains that that which is morally 
good is good in and of itself, the hard determinist Intuitionist 
will maintain that "A is morally good" simply means that "A 
is good in and of itself (and is known to be so by intuition)."8 
7This agreement either being viewed as a historical fact or as a 
hypothetical claim. 
8Now by the above, I do not mean to imply that all conceptions of the 
good can be incorporated into a hard determinist account of morality. 
Indeed one notable exception comes immediately to mind. If one 
understands Intuitionism to be a view "according to which conduct is 
held to be right when conformed to certain precepts or principles of 
Duty, intuitively known to be unconditionally binding" (Sidgwick, p. 3), 
and if one maintains that one cannot be unconditionally bound to do 
that which one cannot do, then one cannot be an Intuitionist and a 
hard determinist. 
However, the inability to incorporate such a view of 'the good' into 
a hard determinist analysis of morality is not a problem for hard 
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We should turn, then, to question (2): What, on a hard 
determinist analysis of morality, are the nature and functions 
of moral rules and moral judgments of actions? Are moral rules 
still prescriptive? Are they categorical or hypothetical? I 
shall argue that on a hard determinist view moral rules may be 
viewed as prescriptive hypothetical imperatives and, further, 
that such a view is not altogether in conflict with traditional 
ethics, i.e., that within the traditional ethical literature, 
there are those (who are not hard determinists) who hold 
similar views of moral rules. Let us first consider the question 
of whether moral rules involve categorical or hypothetical 
imperatives. There is no question that the majority of ethical 
philosophers who view moral rules as imperatives maintain 
that they are categorical. But what must the determinist say 
in this regard? Before suggesting an answer, it will be useful to 
distinguish between two separate issues regarding the 
hypothetical or categorical nature of moral rules. One can ask 
"Are moral rules as rules or principles, categorical or 
hypothetical?" One can also ask "Are moral rules as 
imperatives, hypothetical or categorical?" These are distinct 
questions which, for the hard determinist, require different 
answers.9 
Moral rules as rules or principles must be understood as 
categorical statements or claims. In claiming "A is morally 
desirable" (or more traditionally, "One ought to do A"), one is 
claiming that A categorically satisfies formal criteria of moral 
lightness or goodness, and one intends to be making a 
straightforward truth claim (one which does not require an " i f 
clause to make it true). And although the formal criteria 
utilized to determine whether or not the claim gives a true 
moral principle may differ depending upon one's ethical 
commitments (i.e., if one is a Utilitarian, Intuitionist, 
Contractarian, etc.), we do not intend by "A is morally 
desirable" that , e.g., "A is morally desirable if one is a 
Utilitarian." Indeed, in instances in which we find a conflict in 
judgments regarding the truth of a moral principle between 
those holding opposing ethical theories, we generally take 
determinism. It would become a problem only if it could be 
demonstrated that all other analyses of 'the good' were false. 
9I.e., unless one holds, as 1 suggest in footnote 10, that one can be 
obligated or unconditionally bound to do that which one cannot do. 
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such a conflict to indicate a disproof of the formal criteria used 
by at least one of the theories. Thus moral rules as rules or 
principles are intended as absolute or categorical statements of 
moral Tightness, regardless of any individual's desires, 
philosophic commitments, etc. 
But what of the question, "Are moral rules as imperatives 
categorical or hypothetical?" Although the term is used 
somewhat ambiguously in traditional ethics, by 'imperative' I 
mean the following: an imperative is that which expresses the 
intent to influence the behavior of another, whose articulation 
is intended to be relevant to action, it expresses a command, 
entreaty, advice, exhortation, etc. When considering moral 
rules as imperatives, we are concerned with how their 
expression or articulation affects behavior. And it is in this 
sense of 'imperative' that I wish to maintain that for hard 
determinists moral rules are most plausibly viewed as being or 
involving hypothetical imperatives.1 0 
The view that moral rules are hypothetical imperatives 
has been advanced by, among others, Philippa Foot and John C. 
Harsanyi. 1 1 In his article, Harsanyi (who is clearly not a hard 
determinist) presents and argues for an interpretation of moral 
rules which is nearly identical to the one I would like to 
suggest. 1 2 Thus I maintain that given a hard determinist view 
1 0 One further clarification is required. Hard determinism does not 
necessarily require that moral rules be viewed as hypothetical 
imperatives. A hard determinist may view moral rules as categorical 
imperatives if s/he maintains the following: to say that "You ought to 
do A" is to say "A is morally desirable." "A is morally desirable" is the 
statement of an imperative which is obligatory or unconditionally 
binding. One can be obligated or unconditionally bound to do that 
which one cannot do. I.e., if one holds that one can be obligated or 
unconditionally bound to do what one cannot do, then one can be a 
hard determinist and still maintain that moral rules are, or involve, 
categorical imperatives. On such a view, a hard determinist's account 
of the import of moral rules on actions would remain virtually 
unchanged. 
"Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," 
The Philosophical Review, 81, no. 3 (July 1972): 305-16 and John C. 
Harsanyi, "Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives," Mind, (1958): 
305-16. 
12Although I reject the relativistic overtones which Harsanyi's analysis 
appears to allow for if not actually favor. 
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of behavior, moral rules should be viewed as hypothetical 
imperatives of the form "One ought to do A if one desires to do 
that which is morally good." They provide reasons for S to do 
A. They serve to advise or inform us (their articulation or 
expression affects our behavior) by telling us what sort of 
actions are morally good. (Thus they become one of the causal 
conditions of S's doing A if S wishes to do that which is 
morally good.) 
Viewing moral rules as providing reasons for actions serves 
two purposes with regard to the concerns of this paper. First, it 
demonstrates that the effects of adopting a hard determinist 
view of behavior does not require the total abandonment of 
traditional ethics sometimes suggested by its critics. Secondly, 
the recognition that moral rules constitute reasons for actions 
should make it apparent that moral rules retain their 
significance and remain functional within a hard determinist 
schema. I.e., on a hard determinist account, moral rules affect 
actions as follows: (1) When S desires "to do that which is 
morally good" and (2) When S believes (because of a moral law 
which says "One ought to do A," i.e., "It is morally desirable to 
do A") that if S does A, he will be doing "that which is 
morally good" and (3) When other causal conditions obtain, 
then S will do A. Thus, on a hard determinist account, moral 
rules (or knowledge of moral rules) conjoined with S's desire "to 
do that which is morally good," provide a reason for S's action. 
As such they are the cause, or more strictly one of the causal 
conditions, for S's doing A. 1 3 
The final question with regard to a hard determinist 
analysis of moral rules which I wish to consider here is, "Are 
they prescriptive?" And the answer clearly will depend upon 
what one takes 'prescriptive' to mean. Consider three fairly 
standard analyses of 'prescriptive' suggested by Morris Schlick 
and Haskell Fain. 
In "When is a Man Responsible," Schlick offers the 
following analysis: 
1 3Clearly I am here presuming the rather controversial thesis that 
reasons can be causes. Although it is impossible, within the confines 
of this paper, to offer any thoroughgoing defense of this thesis, my 
position on this issue is very similar to that taken by Donald Davidson 
in "Actions, Reasons and Causes." Review of Metaphysics, 19 (1965-
66): 667-688. 
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In practice.. . ["law"].. . is understood as a rule by which 
the state prescribes certain behavior to its citizens. These 
rules often contradict the natural desires of the citizens (for if 
they did not do so, there would be no reason for making 
them), and are in fact not followed by many of them; while 
others obey, but under compulsion. The state does in fact 
compel its citizens by imposing certain sanctions 
(punishment) which serve to bring their desires into harmony 
with the prescribed laws. 
In natural science, on the other hand, the word "law" 
means something quite different. The natural law is not a 
prescription as to how something should behave, but a 
formula, a description of how something does in fact 
behave. 1 4 
On such an implied analysis of 'prescription', moral laws on 
a hard determinist analysis are prescriptive. Even when the 
cause of (or a causal condition for) S's doing A is a moral law, 
this does not preclude S's having desires which would, if the 
moral law was not causally efficacious in this instance, have 
caused S to do not A. It is also true that on a hard determinist 
analysis of 'moral law,' the laws may not be followed. That is, 
one may be caused to act in a way contrary to the moral law. 
Additionally, on a hard determinist analysis, moral laws are a 
prescription of how one should behave and not a description of 
how one does, in fact, behave. Finally, as analogous to the 
instance of legal rules, one can be compelled on a hard 
determinist account by the threat of public criticism, ostracism, 
etc. and even by legal sanctions to follow the moral laws. That 
is, the threat of punishment can be a causal condition for one's 
decision to do A. As such, given Schlick's analysis of 
'prescription,' moral laws, on a hard determinist analysis, are 
prescriptive. 
In "Prediction and Constraint"15 Haskell Fain suggests two 
different interpretations of 'prediction.' The first, which Fain 
1 4Schlick, Moritz, "When is a Man Responsible," in A Modern 
Introduction to Philosophy, 3rd ed. Arthur Pap and Paul Edwards 
(Eds). New York: Free Press, 1973, pp. 60-61. It should be noted that 
Schlick is not a hard determinist. 
15Mt«d, 67, no. 267, (July, 1958): 366-378. 
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does not endorse, is as follows: "It may . . . be held that the 
crucial distinction between prescriptive and descriptive laws 
consists . . . in the following: prescriptive laws may possibly be 
violated but descriptive laws cannot be violated. . . ." Now 
given such a view, moral laws on a hard determinist analysis 
are prescriptive. One may violate them not because one freely 
chooses to do so, but because one is caused to do so. Fain's second 
interpretation of 'prescriptive' is as follows: ". . . prescriptive 
laws are taken to be a subclass of a class of sentences which may 
be called 'commands,' and which are written or spoken with 
the intention of affecting human behavior. . . . " And on such a 
view, moral laws on a hard determinist analysis still qualify 
as prescriptive. They can be viewed as commands which are 
written or spoken with the intention of affecting human 
behavior. They affect human behavior whenever one's 
knowledge of them is a causal condition for acting or, at least, 
attempting to act in accord with the command (one may, for 
example, try to be benevolent but fail due to an error of 
judgment).16 
Although the three analyses already discussed are rather 
standard, I do not mean to suggest that there are no analyses of 
1 6In "Freedom and Reason," Hare takes a view similar to that of Fain's, 
maintaining that prescriptions are "intended to serve as a guide to 
actions" (pp. 52-3). However in a later passage Hare holds that "...if we 
say that somebody ought to do a certain thing, and 'ought' has its full 
(i.e. universally prescriptive) force, then we give our hearers to 
understand that we think that the question arises to which this is a 
possible answer, which it would not, unless the person in question were 
able to do the acts referred to..." (from Freedom and Reason. Bristol: 
Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 52-4) 
Such a view of universal prescription might appear to conflict with 
the hard determinist's position. However when Hare discusses the 
question of free will later in the chapter (1.4.6 *4.7) it becomes 
apparent that he does not intend the concept of "able to do the acts 
referred to" in any way which would necessarily be contrary to a hard 
determinist's reading. Hare explicitly states that he does not intend to 
prejudge the free will issue and allows for the view that moral laws are 
prescriptive in that the individual is able to act in accord with them 
whenever the individual's knowledge of such laws causes the 
individual to act in accord with them. That is, for Hare, if moral laws 
guide actions by being causes or causal conditions for actions, then 
they are prescriptive. 
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'prescription' under which moral rules on a hard determinist 
analysis would turn out to not be prescriptive.17 However even 
if this is the case, it is clear that they are not (at least purely) 
descriptive. Moral laws on a hard determinist analysis do not 
simply describe how things are but rather advise and/or inform 
us of what actions arc morally desirable. And under the right 
circumstances they or our knowledge of them becomes one of the 
causal conditions of our actions. 
In this limited space, I clearly cannot hope to answer the 
general charge that hard determinism is incompatible with 
morality. I have, however, attempted to demonstrate that it is 
not incompatible with a meaningful use of the moral 'ought' 
and thus not incompatible with having moral rules or making 
moral judgments of actions. It is my hope that the above 
discussion will make the more general charge of 
incompatibility suspect. For while it may be true that there 
are apparent problems in reconciling hard determinism with 
morality, these problems may not be insurmountable. 
1 7Although I have not been able to locate any such definition in the 
literature, in response to an earlier draft of this paper Professor Jon 
Moline suggested the following analysis: To prescribe is to 
recommend that there are other alternatives the one receiving the 
prescription could, de facto, choose instead (even given the presence 
of the prescription). Take this medicine twice daily and don't forget 
to do it on a full stomach" presupposes that the prescribee could take 
it once daily or nine times, and on an empty stomach or not at all. And 
such a suggestion appears in keeping with the intent of some 
discussions of moral rules as prescriptions. See, e.g. Hillel Steiner, 
"Moral Conflict and Prescriptivism," Mind, 82, no. 328, (October 1973). 
Now clearly if this is what is intended by 'prescription' then moral 
laws on a hard determinist analysis are not prescriptive since one 
could not choose to do other than one in fact does, although the 
prescription itself might be a causal condition in the prescribee's 
deciding to do what he otherwise (i.e, without the prescription as a 
causal condition) would not do. 
